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A COMMENT ON NEW YORK TIMES V.
TASINI
t

David Lange

My thanks to Craig Nard for including me in this gathering. I
am grateful to be among my colleagues and friends who are here
today, and to have this opportunity to share my views on New York
Times v. Tasini' with the members of this audience.
I want to talk about Tasini from a perspective that is actually
at some remove from the perspectives that have been presented
thus far. On the one hand, we have considered the interests of
publishers and their allies in the publishing industry; and we have
extended no less attention to the interests of freelance writers and
photographers for whom the Court's decision no doubt will have
many ramifications and implications. The observations of the
speakers who have preceded me are valuable and sensible, and I
agree with (or at least can see the sense in) much of what has been
said on all sides.
But for my own part I would like to talk a bit about the copyright system at large, and in particular about alternative ways of
looking at copyright issues - alternatives not entirely like the ones
that we have heard this morning.
Let me begin with this framing insight: We could, in fact,
live without copyright altogether.
I confess that even for me a world without copyright would
take some getting used to. I have just completed a term as a Trustee of the Copyright Society of the United States. I number copyright professionals and high protectionists among my dearest colleagues and friends and think well of many people in the copyright
industries. However, I do not agree with many aspects of copyright doctrine. I do not think copyright repugnant. But I am at
least a skeptic about the utility in copyright and about its costs.
Perhaps, when push comes to shove, I am even more than a skeptic. Let us say that the views I want to share with you today are
the perspectives of a copyright iconoclast.

t Professor, Duke University School of Law.
533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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I think that copyright could be dispensed with. There would
be some fitful lurches and starts as the world's economies adjusted
to its absence, but in the end I suggest that productivity in the
things we count on copyright to encourage would in fact be increased, both in quality and in quantity. Copyright does have its
uses. But (as one protectionist practitioner observed privately to
me recently) copyright also is very often just an excuse for preserving outmoded business plans in industries that might profitably
benefit from change.
But in fact time is short - and certainly a conclusory allegation as to the disutility in copyright is not more tendentious than
most of what is said in its defense. So I shall content myself here
with merely anecdotal evidence in support of my position.
The sainted Jerry Garcia (of the Grateful Dead) used to say,
"Once we've played it, it's yours." Copyright was never at the
center of the Deadhead's experience. Indeed, when you entered
the sacred precincts of the venue, you found the choicest seats reserved for those who came to tape the concert and to carry it away
in a primitive early exercise in file sharing. There was even a glorious moment in the evolution of the experience the Dead provided
when, if you wanted to, you could actually plug your recording
equipment directly into the Dead's own sound system in order to
avoid degradation of quality in the resultant product - namely, the
tape of the concert you intended to take away with you to share
with others. And yet the Grateful Dead was the highest grossing
rock band of all time (more so in their day even than the Beatles or
the Stones). And what was the reason for this success? It was that
what you got when you went to a Dead concert was the authentic
experience itself. What you paid for was access to authenticity,
immediate and direct, a business model still worthy of emulation
and consideration even in our time.
I repeat, then: the Dead made money hand over fist, and they
made it largely without concern for the copyright in their performances. And I mean to suggest that it is possible generally for good
musicians to be productive artists and to make money without having a copyright.
Now, in contrast, I want to bring to your attention the experience of another industry: the movie industry. I want to tell you
about how that industry works within the framework of contemporary copyright. Thanks to the omnipresent influence of lawyers
and of copyright, and the constant evolution of all the rights that
have been secured by the guilds, we encounter here an industry in
which, in the main, good people do not work at all.
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I have friends who consider themselves to be (and whom I
myself regard as being) serious screen writers - but who have not
sold a screenplay in twenty five years. And far from being unusual, theirs is the typical experience of the creative artist in the
motion picture industry. If you have in mind working in the movie
business, then have in mind working at something else that you
can make a living from, because the likelihood that you will do it
in the film industry is very close to zero. The simple, central truth
about the motion picture industry is that copyright sustains a production habitat in the industry that is fundamentally antithetical to
the success of individual creativity.
We could dispense with copyright, and the barriers to entry in
the motion picture industry would be swept away within the passing of a generation. Movies would continue to be produced, and in
greater numbers, with no necessary diminution in quality. Good
people would find work to do. The market would determine the
success or failure of their products without the impediments inevitably posed by a system of monopolies. New and better business
plans would follow. Dare I say it? The world would be a better
place.
Of course I do not expect that this will come to pass.
But it is certainly possible to imagine that copyright might be
very substantially reformed. And there are aspects of the Court's
opinion in Tasini that I do think encourage us to look in the direction of reform.
Particularly, I have in mind the Part IV of Justice Ginsberg's
opinion, in which she said (almost as though it were a thought in
passing) that nothing in Tasini need portend any loss from the perspective of the public: We do not have to worry about the possibility that the public domain will somehow be cheated of all these
works that are the subject of our ruling here. That is not something we need to worry about at all. Why, if we need to, we can
just withhold injunctive relief. We have done that before - we
v. Acuff-Rose
have done it in well-known cases, including Cambell
3
Music, Inc.2 - and we can do it again if we want to.
The implications in this passage (I have paraphrased it here,
but it is no less pointed in the original) are really quite remarkable,
even stunning. In the few moments remaining to me, I want to
suggest what this might mean in practice.
Were we really to pay attention to Part IV of Justice Ginsberg's opinion, we would effectively convert copyright from a
2 510 U.S. 569 (1994).

Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06.
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property regime into what my colleagues in the academy like to
call "a liability regime." In effect, we would convert copyright
into a regime in which anyone could appropriate copyrighted work
as, when, and where he or she pleased, against an understanding
that after the taking the question would be, not whether they were
entitled to appropriate the work, but rather how much they would
be obliged to pay for it having done so. It is possible to imagine
compensating an author for the author's investment in the actual
production of a work and some reasonable return on that investment - and to pay no more than just that. I think this is the essence of what Dennis Karjala has been proposing for many years,
and it may be time for all of us to recognize the merit in his ideas.
Another way of looking at such a regime is to see it as having
the effect of converting fair use into a new and broader affirmative
right than fair use is now conventionally thought to be, a fair use
which is given paramountcy under the Copyright Act vis a vis the
exclusive rights of authors. In my view (and I believe in the view
of some of my colleagues in the academy, as well as Judge Birch
in his opinion in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 4 - the socalled Wind Done Gone case) this would work a less revolutionary
change than many other students and practitioners of copyright
might suppose. Indeed I would argue that this is actually what the
text of section 107 already suggests. When section 107 is read in
conjunction with section 106, it seems perfectly clear from the
texts that fair use is an entitlement superior to the exclusive rights
in copyright, and not the other way around. Of course, under conventional fair use doctrine, the defendant who wins a fair use claim
pays nothing for its appropriation. But there is no reason why that
must be so. Suggestions are beginning to be made quite generally
to the effect that the fair use claimant might be obliged to pay
some reasonable amount for the appropriation, or perhaps to
apportion some of whatever it realizes from further exploitation of
the antecedent work.
I do not have time to explore these ideas fully here or to acknowledge those who have already advanced them in one form or
another. But in offering them in this summary fashion I hope to
have suggested more generally how one might move usefully from
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Tasini to a view of copyright at large
in which the proprietary nature of rights under that regime would
be displaced by a system in which appropriation, rather than proprietorship, would become the central norm.
4 268 F.3d 1257 (2001).
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This would carry us well beyond the narrow outcome in Tasini, to be sure. But it would be a movement altogether consistent
with an increasing role for the public domain. And in my view,
reimagining the public domain is the principal challenge that lies
ahead of all of us who are interested in developments in the law of
copyright.
I thank Craig Nard again for inviting me to comment on today's subject matter and applaud the speakers who have preceded
me on the excellence of their presentations.

